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PROCESS DESIGN FOR SELECTION OF HEMODIALYSIS
AND ORGAN TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS*
AL KATZt
THE PROBLEM
T his article will focus on the delivery of extraordinary medical
services of two kinds: hemodialysis and organ transplantation. The
delivery of these services generates a series of problems as extraordi-
nary as the services themselves. The central problem dealt with in
this article, though complex in its details, is simply stated: how are
extraordinary medical services to be delivered when the demand far
exceeds the supply? If hemodialysis equipment, ancillary resources, and
organs for transplantation were available in every case to meet need
there would remain a number of vexing technical, ethical and legal
problems, but the construction of a delivery system would be a rela-
tively simple matter.
The problem of scarcity is entirely economic with regard to hemo-
dialysis, but somewhat less so with regard to organ transplantation. In
the latter instance scarcity is generated by a variety of noneconomic
barriers to the acquisition of organs for transplantation. There are
legal, technical and ethical barriers to the acquisition of cadaveric or-
gans from live donors. Resolution of the legal questions tends to be a
function of consensus on the ethical and religious questions, while
resolution of the technical problems awaits the progress of medical re-
search. But even with these problems resolved, an element of scarcity
would remain due to the high cost of delivering such services.
* This paper was originally prepared as a consultant report to the project on "Social
Factors Affecting the Modem Treatment for Catastrophic Disease," Professors Jay Katz
and Alexander Capron, Directors (N.I.H. No. 9470-42-44609).
t Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York, Buffalo. B.S., Temple
University, 1963; J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1966; L.L.M., 1967.
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In contrast to organ transplantation, the delivery of hemodialysis
presents no problems which are entirely independent of economic
scarcity. Were the supply of equipment and personnel adequate to meet
the need-demand, questions such as whether an individual with chronic
organic disorders in addition to renal failure should be given dialysis,
or whether preference should be given to an individual 35 years of
age over an individual 55 years of age, would be entirely moot.
For the most part the problems in designing a process for the de-
livery of extraordinary medical services are not affected by the specific
causes of the scarcity which generates the need for a designed delivery
process. But this is not uniformly the case. For example, assuming
perfected tissue typing techniques, it is possible that an organ located
in New York should, for medical reasons, be given to an individual lo-
cated in San Francisco. On the condition that transportation costs are
irrelevant, the only remaining question is whether the organ should be
delivered fresh to a less perfectly matched New York recipient or trans-
ported to San Francisco taking the risks of organ deterioration-as-
suming imperfect storage technology. This is not a question of cost.
However, the question of whether to deliver hemodialysis in San Fran-
cisco to a less "suitable" San Francisco individual or a more "suitable"
Salt Lake City individual would not arise at all isolated from the cost
involved in producing an adequate number of dialysis machines.
The problem of scarcity can be approached from a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective. Since the scarcity of organs for transplantation is
not resolvable economically, it may be that even in the absence of
legal, ethical and some technical barriers the incidence of chronic renal
failure would still exceed the supply of kidneys for transplantation.
Thus the question of resource allocation to either research, delivery
of dialysis, or transplant technology is a particularly complex one.
Given the fact of scarcity, it is necessary to design a process for the
delivery of these extraordinary services that maximizes all relevant
goals and protects all relevant values. It is important, however, to
emphasize that these relevant goals and values are not all service spe-
cific: once one begins to consider goals and values in connection with
a process there arise process specific goals to achieve and process specific
values to protect. In other words, the medium through which delivery
decisions are made has independent characteristics. Such independent
characteristics exist &cause of the underlying considerations resulting
in the initially perceivectneed for a process, and because a process is al-
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most invariably of public character--even when used by so-called
private bodies or institutions.
In the context of the delivery of extraordinary medical services,
the general consideration which gives rise to the perceived need for a
process is scarcity; the specific considerations are the goal of thera-
peutic success, and the value conflicts which arise when the goal of
therapeutic success does not itself fairly determine who shall receive the
service. A process is one attempt to solve these problems, but it is a
kind of solution having characteristics which may be inconsistent with
other goals-such as the goal of therapeutic success itself. Were the
goal of therapeutic success of dispositive significance, we would simply
tolerate the affront to other values which necessarily occurs because
that goal may not itself fairly determine who shall receive the service.
A process designed to decide who shall receive extraordinary med-
ical services must (1) maximize the goal of therapeutic success; (2)
minimize or eliminate affronts to values which arise out of the inability
to make the decision entirely on the basis of factors generated by the
goal of therapeutic success; (3) meet the essential requirements of
good processes;' and (4) meet the essential requirements of a process
designed to distribute a scarce resource.
Disease is no respecter of political boundaries, but corrective
mechanisms often are. Organs for transplant are often found far from
their best recipients; hemodialysis machines are not distributed accord-
ing to population,2 and even if they were the vagaries of disease would
still create serious logistical problems. A mobile population and a
federal system means that individuals may be subject to varying legal
constraints and regulations at different points in their lives. The exist-
ence of a general federal government presents possibilities for facilitat-
ing delivery mechanisms, but also present serious problems of political
and economic management. Because the process suggested herein con-
templates pooling both resources and recipients, such political boundary
considerations are quite relevant.
To some extent these problems can be resolved technically. Com-
puter interconnections between delivery centers make it possible to
know almost instantly who needs what particular service and where
the available services are. The logistical problems which ensue are par-
1. See discussion of processes at section 1 infra.
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, KIDNEY DISEASE
SERVICES, FACILITIES, AND PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d rev. 1971).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tially technical (organ storage), partially economic (who pays for
transporting the service or the individual), and partially humane (the
impact of relocation on the individual and family). In part the magni-
tude of these problems depends on the initial structuring of the de-
livery system: is it to be statewide, regional, or national? If the major
purpose of the process is facilitation of service delivery, then the or-
ganization of the delivery system should be based on criteria relevant
only to service delivery.3
At present regional arrangements do exist by virtue of agreements
between medical service institutions. 4 I have not examined the extent
to which such existing arrangements are adequately delivering serv-
ices, but it would seem that general notions of public responsibility re-
quire at least supervision if not control over such arrangements. The
matter of delivering lifesaving medical services is ultimately the re-
sponsibility of medical professionals, but the management structure
is something other than a matter of medical professional judgment.
Such supervision can be effectuated through either of two traditional
forms: interstate agreements or federal legislation.
In this article I do not attempt to deal with the problem of ac-
quiring organs for transplantation; with the cost burden of either dial-
ysis or transplantation; with the cost of the process designed to decide
who shall receive these services; or with the problems of consent aris-
ing primarily in donor-recipient transplantation. Rather, I have con-
fined this article to a consideration of the process required to deliver
extraordinary medical services: hemodialysis and homotransplantation.
My treatment of the process problem will be divided into three sec-
tions: (1) a consideration of the analogies and dissimilarities found
in existing legal processes; (2) a proposed process for both dialysis
and transplantation; and (3) a commentary on the proposed processes.
I. SOME LEGAL PROCESS ANALOGIES AND DISSIMILARITIES
A process designed to facilitate the delivery of extraordinary
medical services is essentially a distributive one. Hence relatively clear
3. For example, the degree of organ deterioration which results from the delays
of transportation may preclude a national pool of potential recipients but may leave a
regional pool within the range of possibility. In any event, a variety of legal/organizational
techniques are available to facilitate decisions made on the basis of criteria relevant
only to service delivery. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is an example of one such
technique: uniformity by consensus rather than by compulsion of law. See UNIFORDI
ANATOmICAL GIFT ACT.
4. See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, supra note 2.
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or direct analogies from the existing American legal system are not
readily available. Existing judicial processes are largely directed toward
resolving disputes of an either direct or indirect public nature. Exist-
ing administrative processes, howvever, are often concerned with dis-
tribution of more or less scarce resources: for example, licenses and
welfare payments. But even in administrative processes the similarities
to delivery of extraordinary medical services are less than perfect.
Existing distributive processes deal with resources whose scarcity is
created artificially, like communications licenses, or with resources
sufficiently divisible to allow for the legislative option to distribute more
or less broadly while adjusting the quantity accordingly.5 Once this
legislative option has been exercised the administrative task is to ef-
fectuate the distributive pattern established by the underlying legisla-
tive choice of distribution strategy. Thus the distribution of extra-
ordinary medical services differs in two primary respects from exist-
ing distributive processes: (1) The scarcity of organs for transplant is
not artificially created, and the scarcity of equipment and personnel
for dialysis is artificial only in the sense that it arises from the failure
to devote sufficient resources so as to eliminate the scarcity; and (2)
in neither case is it possible to exercise a legislative option for broader
distribution at a lower quantitative level.
The process which distributes extraordinary medical services im-
plements policies which differ significantly from existing processes in
the sense that they are directed less to the achievement of social goals
and more toward the prevention of affronts to social values. Both the
licensing and welfare types of distributive processes are created to ef-
fectuate social policies which would not be served in the absence of such
distributive processes. But it is most likely that the goal of therapeutic
success would be served even in the absence of a more or less formal
public distributive process. Thus, a process designed to distribute ex-
traordinary medical services has a negative orientation: to forestall af-
fronts to social values in the course of delivering therapeutically success-
ful extraordinary medical services. It is this negative orientation which
prevents simple analogical application of existing distributive processes
to this problem.
However, aspects of existing processes of many types may be bor-
rowed as effective analogies. Particular problems in the delivery of ex-
traordinary medical services are similar to particular problems in other
5. E.g., Public Assistance.
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distributive processes, and the process proposed in this paper will bor-
row freely wherever it is feasible and prudent to do so. Since a more
detailed examination of the similarities and differences between exist-
ing distributive processes and the delivery of extraordinary medical
services may clarify the peculiarities of the latter, I would like to exam-
ine in some detail a few of the putative analogies.
A. Selective Service
The major task of the Selective Service process was to distribute the
burden of military service in a way which was both fair and consonant
with social purposes6-assuming these to be less than perfectly iso-
metric goals. Since the res to be distributed was a burden which many
individuals would seek to avoid, it was possible to design a process for
the distribution of a burden which would also serve a variety of other
social purposes-such as encouraging individuals to continue their
education, or "channel" them into particular activities determined to
be socially worthy by exempting or deferring the burden of service for
individuals involved in such activities. If one assumes that the risk of
death increases measurably for those individuals upon whom the bur-
den of military service does fall, then the Selective Service process can
be seen as one which determines who shall have a greater lease on life,
and this determination may be made in accordance with a set of social
value choices. In this sense the Selective Service process resembles the
distribution of extraordinary medical services, or at least one possible
way of doing so.
The Selective Service process begins with the creation of a maxi-
mally inclusive pool: all males must register when they reach the age of
18 years. The process thus begins by the creation of a pool the mem-
bership of which is determined by two simple, totally reflexive cri-
teria. No individual is excluded from the pool at this stage on any
basis other than age and sex. Direct analogy to extraordinary medical
services would mean that every individual with a relevant disease or
condition (e.g., chronic renal failure, liver disease, etc.) would be in-
cluded in a pool on the basis of these gross criteria. Thereafter, a process
of elimination would take place.
At this point it is worth noting some significant differences even
at this stage of the process. With regard to Selective Service there is no
6. See generally, Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 451 et seq.
(1970).
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inherent problem of scarcity; failure to select everyone for military
service is a social choice not demanded by anything inherent in the
operation, as the practice in other nations indicates. In addition, those
who are eliminated by the process receive what they (generally) per-
ceive to be a benefit and seldom complain, while those eliminated by a
medical service delivery process are subjected to a mortal burden and
are likely to complain. This difference has serious process implications,
if only in terms of proportional numbers. That is, the proportional rela-
tionship in Selective Service of potential complainants to the total pool
is significantly smaller than it is likely to be in the delivery of extra-
ordinary medical services. This is particularly serious in any process
where the burden of process correction depends in the first instance on
the initiative of the individual.
The Selective Service process operates by matching individuals
with a set of predetermined standards-whether the precise task is in-
duction or exclusion/exemption. At no time is it necessary to make a
decision as to one individual which is relative to another individual.
At no point in the process is anyone in a position to say that he was
selected/not selected and someone else was/was not. The only opera-
tions which even closely approximate this are the administrative or
judicial decisions creating precedents for exclusion/exemption under
which a particular individual may claim. But since the precedent
itself was a result of a matching of individual facts with a priori
standards, the precedent making decision itself becomes an a priori
standard against which the individual characteristics of the next case are
to be matched. Only by gross oversimplification can it be said that in
the Selective Service process individuals are selected on a relative basis.
However, in the case of extraordinary medical services relative selec-
tion is unavoidable even given the availability of refined a priori med-
ical and/or social standards. Relative selection is unavoidable because
of scarcity. (I do not mean to intimate by this that relative selection
cannot be avoided by randomizing the process.)
One further characteristic of the Selective Service process is worth
mentioning. Since the initial pool is universal with respect to the adult
male population, exemptions/deferments are either a matter of grace
or a matter of policy depending on one's personal perceptions. In this
instance the ability to induct everybody, the exercise of the greater
power, does largely include the power to induct selectively, the exer-
cise of the lesser power. The only constraints placed upon the exercise
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of the lesser power are (1) that distinctions between individuals or
classes may not be upon constitutionally impermissible grounds, 7 and
(2) the process must be constructed fairly and must operate fairly in
fact.8 In Selective Service process fairness may include a significant
quantum of administrative discretion, perhaps because the Congress
could have legally exercised the option of inducting everybody. This is
supported by the preinduction review cases which permit preinduc-
tion judicial review, in the teeth of a statutory prohibition, in cases
where there is an allegation of serious administrative illegality and no
factual dispute committed to agency discretion for resolution.9
The situation with extraordinary medical services is quite different.
The initially relevant class does not even approximate universality, but
consists only of those who by "chance" suffer from catastrophic dis-
eases. No explicit or implicit policy choices are involved in the drawing
of this class from the general population. Further, there is no ques-
tion of power to treat everyone in this class, though there may be
some question of capacity. In any case, narrowing this initial class is
largely (though not entirely) a question of necessity rather than a
matter of social policy. While it may be true that the outer constraints
on the process of therapeutic selection are the same as those indicated
for selective service, the meaning of process fairness may change sub-
stantially. Selection for treatment can not be a matter of grace (though
it may be, in part, a function of chance), and the sense in which
selection for treatment may be a function of social policy is, in terms
of fairness, substantially altered by the circumstance that the original
pool does not even approach universality but is created by the seren-
dipidous operation of catastrophic diseases. In support of this observa-
tion I can only assert that the allocation of an increased risk of death as
a matter of social policy requires differential justification where the
population is preselected by the acquisition of disease rather than semi-
universal social criteria.
Perhaps it is worth concluding this discussion with the observation
that the Selective Service process in no way essentially depends for its
operation on a body of arcane data or a highly expert professional
group. The delivery of extraordinary medical services depends essen-
tially on both. Because of this there is considerably less freedom to
7. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
8. See Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
9. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970).
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manipulate or vary the delivery process: the process exists to serve the
goal of therapeutic success-which is defined, at least in operational
terms, by medical science. There is no such a priori goal in selective
military service, unless it be the raising of an army. I think it is fair
to say (with all necessary concessions made to the debate over the rela-
tive efficiency of a voluntary versus a conscripted army) that the ability
to raise an efficient army is much less dependent on the manner of
selection than the ability to deliver successful therapy is dependent
on a service delivery selection process.
B. Criminal Law Process
The possibility that the criminal law process may be a useful
analogy arises primarily from its quality as the most careful
public process in the common law tradition. Its ethic demands both
accuracy in the selection of individuals for punishment, and a process
that has scrupulous regard for process specific values. But I believe that
below this level of generality the criminal law process exhibits traits
that make it minimally useful as an analogy.
The strongest case for analogy arises if the criminal law process
is seen as dedicated to selecting individuals for whom punishment is
appropriate. In theory at least, the selection takes place from among
all individuals who have committed a punishable act (for my purposes
punishable act is defined to include the relevant mens rea) : the punish-
able act defines the gross pool. Thus membership in the gross pool is
determined by individual acts which are (presumptively) individual
acts of will rather than the consequence of disease. (This presumption
is attacked by the radical-conspiratorial thesis which holds that the
powerful classes purposively create offenses which less powerful classes
will commit but which the ruling class can avoid. In the terms of this
thesis the question is whether the individual retains the last
clear chance to avoid inclusion in the pool. With regard to strict
liability offenses, however, the matter of last clear chance may be sig-
nificantly different.) To the extent this membership criteria is true, the
criminal law process is similar to selective service in that there is no
essential reason why all members of the initial pool may not be selected
-either for military service or punishment. That some subset of this
group is selected is a function of policy rather than a function of
scarcity. In the criminal law process all members of the pool determined
by the commission of a punishable offense are not selected for punish-
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ment because the cost of doing so from initiation (discovery, arrest)
to termination (incarceration, release) is judged to exceed the social
benefit which would derive from "full enforcement." The scarcity is
thus artificial in the sense that it is a function of a cost-benefit deter-
mination. On the other hand, the judgment that all those with cata-
strophic diseases are not to be treated is not a function of an affirma-
tive cost-benefit assessment.
As a practical matter, the criminal law process selects individuals
for punishment as a function of chance, policy and relative resource
scarcity. To the extent the combination of chance, policy and relative
scarcity results in a failure to select all those individuals included in
the gross pool by reason of commission of a punishable act, the harm
of nonselection is spread evenly throughout the population. The loss
of deterrent force and the potential of future victimization theoretically
fall evenly on the general population. Though in fact this is often not
true-the poor are more likely to be victims of certain offenses than
the higher classes; those who know the offender are more likely to be
the victims of certain assaultive offenses than others-it is still true that
the impact of nonselection is broader than is ever the case in nonselec-
tion for extraordinary medical services where the bulk of the impact
is on the individual and his family or close friends.
The process significance of these observations regarding the impact
of nonselection is twofold. First, in the criminal law process non-
selection results in a windfall to the individual who has been involved
in a punishable act, whereas nonselection for dialysis or transplantation
results in a greatly increased probability of death to the individual.
Secondly, in the criminal law process nonselection is the consequence
of social cost-benefit judgments which include an assessment that the
broad social harm resulting from nonselection is tolerable, whereas
nonselection for dialysis or tranplantation is largely not the result of
a social cost-benefit judgment, and the harm resulting from nonselection
falls with particular severity on the nonselected individual. In the
criminal law process no one has any particular cause to complain about
an instance of selection apart from the individual selected, whereas in
the selection for dialysis and transplantation all those not selected may
indeed have reason to complain. The precise process implications of
this will be dealt with in a later section.10
The core of the criminal law process, at least in theory, is the stage
10. See note 44 infra, and accompanying text.
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at which guilt/innocence is adjudicated. Here, again, the distinction
between judgments which are a function of matching individual char-
acteristics against fixed standards, and judgments which are a function
of matching the best set of individual characteristics against more or
less fixed standards is most important. In the criminal law process guilt
is not relative; in the delivery of extraordinary medical services suita-
bility is relative-unless the problem is avoided by selection on a first-
come-first-served or other similarly "objective" basis. Since the adjudi-
cation of guilt/innocence is not relative, no judgments of degree are
possible. That is, the criminal process is not structured to permit a
conclusion that since prison facilities are available, and since the, indi-
vidual is somewhat guilty, he will be convicted. An extraordinary med-
ical service delivery process should certainly be structured to permit
and require such a result.
It is interesting to note that decisions to incarcerate based on rela-
tive guilt and institutional availability are not uncommon in the
juvenile process, and severe criticism has been leveled at it because of
such decisions." Similarly, some involuntary commitment decisions are
known to be based on judgments of relative danger and institutional
availability. Here criticism of the process tends to be less didactic,
probably reflecting greater uncertainty about whether the process goal
is essentially therapeutic or essentially social protection.12
To some extent notions of institutional availability and relative
guilt may be significant at the sentencing stage of the criminal law
process, but even if this is true the analogical value of the sentencing
process is reduced by a number of other considerations. Institutional
availability in the criminal law process, and in the juvenile process as
well, is itself a matter of relative scarcity. There is no fixed point at
which institutions are unable to handle another individual, at least not
in the same sense in which there is a point at which a dialysis machine
cannot take another individual, or the point at which there are no
organs available for transplantation.
Furthermore, whether we focus on the "bounded" discretion of
the judge or the "free" discretion of a sentencing jury, both may be
influenced by notions of moral forfeiture and/or rehabilitative poten-
tial. Certainly moral forfeiture should play no part in a medical serv-
ice delivery process-not even indirectly.'3 Rehabilitative potential,
11. D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 125 (1964).
12. R. RoCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968).
13. See notes 46-47 infra, and accompanying text.
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on the other hand, is crucial to the extent it is subsumed by the primary
goal of therapeutic success. But the similarities do not increase the ana-
logical value of the sentencing process. In the sentencing process high
rehabilitative prognosis may mean a probationary sentence, a short
prison term, a supervised community release term, conditional re-
lease or commitment to a nonpenal institution. A low rehabilitative
prognosis, at least when combined with the necessity for custodial care,
leads to incapacitative incarceration. Therefore, even though both the
sentencing process and the medical service delivery process are con-
cerned with some type of rehabilitation, the dissimilarity of conse-
quences seriously diminishes the utility of the sentencing process as
an analogy.
One further word needs to be said about rehabilitation even
though the point will be made again in a later section. In the sentencing
process rehabilitation as a goal of the process means a full return to
nondeviant social life. Similar notions of rehabilitation have been used
in decisions regarding the delivery of hemodialysis and in studies of
success rates of hemodialysis patients.14 In my view, a definition of re-
habilitation which includes a return to gainful employment, employ-
ment of the same type, or any similar type of social reintegration
characteristic should play no part in the selection decision or in the
assessment of therapeutic success save, in the latter instance, to the ex-
tent that it can be shown that failure of full social reintegration has a
clear impact on the therapeutic regime. I take this position for the
following reasons: in no other type of medical service is such a judg-
ment made-from appendectomy to cerebral hemorrhage; there is no
way to fairly predict broadly defined rehabilitative potential; it leaves
room for serious abuse. In one reported instance,15 for example, a male
high school teacher had to move his residence to another state in order
to receive hemodialysis therapy. But he could no longer work as a
teacher in the state of his new domicile because it refused such em-
ployment to anyone with a chronic disease. The notions of rehabili-
tation expressed with some frequency in the literature would permit
this particular dialysis center to refuse therapy to the next high school
teacher on the ground that he could not be rehabilitated in that statel
14. See, e.g., Meldrum, Wolfram & Rubini, The Impact of Chronic Hemodialysis
upon the Socio-Economics of a Veteran Patient Group, 21 3. OiRoNia DiSEASEs 37,
43 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Meldrum].
15. Id. at 49,51.
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In another example, 16 a male receiving hemodialysis was considered
not to be fully rehabilitated because he now stays home and attends
to domestic matters while his wife is gainfully employed. Indeed, one
report17 conceded without a hint of self-consciousness that occupational
rehabilitation was not a relevant factor in assessing the suitability of
female patients for hemodialysis therapy.
C. "Shipwreck" Cases
The two legendary cases dealing with acts of murder performed
under a claim of justification, U.S. v. Holmes,'8 and Regina v. Dudley
and Stephens,O raise the question whether either the circumstances of
those cases or the manner in which the courts treated them may be in-
structive with respect to the design of a process for delivery of extra-
ordinary medical services. On the assumption of an accepted principle
of justification which holds that it is better that one live rather than
all die, these cases do present the problem of selecting who shall live-
though in fact their predominant concern was with the decision re-
garding who shall die.
The Holmes case suggests that if it is justified to take life in order
that other lives may be saved, the selection of the victim cannot be
predicated upon personal characteristics, but must reflect the essential
equality of all human lives. On the other hand, it seems to have been
conceded in Dudley and Stevens that the selection of the victim was
rational in light of the circumstances, although such rationality in no
way pretermitted the question of justification. Professor Fuller's "Spe-
luncean Explorers" fiction 0 reflects the suggestion in Holmes by having
the sacrificial victim selected by lot. Sanders and Dukeminier suggest
that these instances would be more in point if one imagined that the
selection was being made by a disinterested committee rather than by
members of the group itself in jeopardy.2' The suggestion is well taken,
but less than crucial. Indeed, why not design a process so that those
who are in need of dialysis or transplantation themselves make the de-
cision as to who shall receive the lifesaving intervention? While there
16. See id. at 41-47.
17. See Sand, Livingston & Wright, Psychological Assessment of Candidates for a
Dialysis Program, 74 ANNAL.S OF INTERNAL MFD. 602 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Sand].
18. 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (O.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
19. 142 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
20. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 IIAv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
21. Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 357, 374 (1968).
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may be reasons for rejecting such a suggestion, one cannot do so a
priori by denying the utility of an analogy. Furthermore, if the process
must be random. it hardly matters whether those involved do it or
some other disinterested group. Finally, since the issue raised by these
cases is the issue of criteria, focus on the operatives of the process is
tangential.
If the justification for sacrifice lies in the belief that it is better
that one live rather than all die, it follows that those selected to live
should have a substantial chance of surviving after the decision to
sacrifice another is made. It would be pointless, in terms of the princi-
ple, to design a selection process which could result in the sacrifice of a
healthy individual to save the life of another who is likely to expire
momentarily from natural causes. The principle of justification, which
conceivably would bar punishment for the sacrifice, is at best only
formally served by such a process. Thus it seems clear that the problem
of choice cannot be resolved by a reflexive invocation of randomness. 22
If the decision as to who shall live can only be predicated upon
certain personal characteristics, and if pure randomness is not always
an acceptable alternative, is it possible to combine these styles in a
humane process? I think it is possible. The law generally recognizes
that some personal characteristics may be tAken into account for some
purposes. The question tends to be: what is the bearing of the personal
characteristic on the issue at hand? This is not, however, purely a
question of logic or fact. It is often a question of whether a particular
characteristic ought to have a bearing on the issue at hand.28 The
ought question may indeed be influenced by considerations of ra-
tionality, but though such considerations may be necessary they can
never be sufficient. Thus, in Dudley and Stevens it may have been ra-
tional to select the particular victim for sacrifice because of his poor
health, but not because of his age or inability to resist. The condition
of his health is rationally related to the principle of maximizing the
number of lives to be saved; the other two characteristics may or may
not be related to the principle, but in any event they tend to indicate
that the potential victim is an individual of less value as a person, and
hence would be impermissible on grounds of general principles.
The Model Penal Code section and comments on justification24
22. Cf., D. DAUBE, COLLABORATION WITH TYRANNY IN RABBINIc LAW (1965).
23. Cf., Cahn, Jurisprudence, in SURVEY OF AMER. LAW 809, 826-27 (1954).
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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agree with the basic notion that one may act in a manner which hastens
the death of some if, by not acting, the death of all is virtually as-
sured. Thus, if three mountain climbers are roped together and the
two lower ones lose their footing, the lead climber may cut the other
two loose when he can no longer tolerate the weight. By cutting the two
loose he is not killing two but saving one life; in the absence of such
action all three would be killed. The consequence of his act is a net
saving of lives. This particular example, however, is not helpful on
the question of criteria insofar as the selection of who shall live has
been made by the circumstances: no real act of selection among indi-
viduals is possible.
The analogical value of the "shipwreck" cases is limited to the ap-
plication of the fundamental principle of justification. These cases are
not helpful on the question of process or criteria except insofar as they
suggest that (1) randomness may be a requisite, but (2) the principle
requiring a net saving of lives may require the application of some
set of relevant criteria for selection. If they do nothing else the "ship-
wreck" cases indicate that the most profound questions of justice are
involved in the problem of delivering dialysis and transplantation
services. Under what circumstances does justice require or permit
individuals to be treated as fungibles? 25 May not the principle of
equality, so conceived, conflict with the principle of justification?
Sometime ago Kelsen observed 26 that the principle of equality estab-
lished an open category: since pure human fungibility was acceptable
in no society, the principle of equality could be made meaningful only
by the application of norms indicating relevant differences between
individuals or classes of individuals. Recent work in social psychology
indicates that perceptions of equity/inequity are similarly affected by
individual perception of relevant differences.
27
25. See D. DAUBE, supra note 22.
26. H. KELSEN, W AT IS JUSTICE? 15 (1957).
27. (For the material in this note and in note 47, I am indebted to John
Sarenman, graduate student, Dep't of Psychology, State University of New York at
Buffalo.)
A number of writers have dealt with the problem of inequity, but the most detailed
formulation of the process is that of Adams. At the outset, one must be aware that
Adams is not dealing with actual inequity. He is dealing with an individual's perception
of inequity, and while there may also be actual inequity it is not necessary. The starting
point for Adams is that whenever two individuals exchange something, there exists the
possibility that one or both will feel that the exchange has been inequitable. Inequity
will result when one of the parties perceives an imbalance between his inputs into the
exchange and his outcomes from the exchange. Inputs are specified in terms of per-
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D. Comparative Hearings in the F.C.C.: the Biscayne Case
The allocation of VHF television licenses is to some extent a
problem of natural scarcity and to some extent one of artificial scarcity:
twelve frequencies are available, but the applicable legal standards
seldom permit all twelve to be used. In either event, the applicable
legal process involves the distribution of a resource among applicants
where it is not possible to give something to all; it is a zero-sum game.
As such, it is one of the few instances in our society of a truly distribu-
tive legal process.
The Federal Communications Commission has developed the
"comparative hearing" in response to the Supreme Court's insistence
ceived attributes that a party brings to the exchange and feels are relevant to the
exchange. An attribute can only assume the form of an input if its possessor recognizes
its existence and feels that it is relevant. (It is important to note that only the possesser
of the attribute must recognize it and feel that it is relevant.) If an attribute is seen as
relevant, the possessor of that attribute will expect a fair return for it as an input.
Inputs can be of most any form, the form usually being decided by the situation in which
the exrhange is taking place.
Outcomes are also perceived by the recipient. If the recipient of a given return
perceives the return as relevant to the exchange, the return will become an outcome for
him. Because the correlation between inputs and outcomes is less than perfect, the
problem of inequity arises. The basis for the feelings of inequity is not, however, ab-
solute inequity. Rather it is the perceived imbalance between the inputs and the outcomes.
Because of the inclusion of a perceptual process in assessing inequity, the problem
becomes one also of comparison. An individual existing in complete isolation from the
remainder of the environment cannot experience feelings of inequity. He must have an-
other person or group of persons with which to compare himself. Given the comparison,
the process as formulated by Adams contemplates that when the normative expectations
of the person making social comparisons are violated-when he finds his inputs and
outcomes are not in balance in relation to those of others-feelings of inequity result.
Adams's definition of inenuity follows from this statement. Inequity exists for a person
when his perceived inputs and/or outcomes are not properly related, psychologically,
to the inputs and/or outcomes of another person with whom the person compares himself.
Adams suggests that whether or not inputs and outcomes are perceived as properly
related will be a function of the cultural norms regarding the inputs and outcomes. This
is evident since many people from the same culture will react in similar manners to
inequity in specified situations. For most Americans, an individual receiving either too
little or too much for his labor is seen as inequitable, since they use their own input/
outcome balance in determining what is fair.
Because of the manner in which Adams has conceptualized inequity, there exists a
need to reduce it when it is felt. Like cognitive dissonance, inequity is seen to be an
aversive psychological state. Adams gives a number of different ways in which inequity
can be reduced, but four are of particular concern here; leaving the field and changing
the comparison person are two of these. Leaving the field essentially means that the
person will remove himself from the exchange. If the individual attempts to change his
comparison figure, he will attempt to choose someone who is like himself and with whom
he does not feel inequity. In many situations, this will be difficult to accomplish, and to
do it, the person may also have to leave the field. A third fashion in which an individual
could reduce felt inequity would be to distort his view of his inputs. If a person feels
that he is being underpaid relative to another who does the same work, he might reduce
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that where two or more applicants apply for a single frequency the
applications should be heard together.2 8 The applicable legal standard
provides for awards where the "public interest, convenience or neces-
sity" would be served thereby, and the FCC has developed a set of
criteria to facilitate operation of the standard.29 The Biscayne con-
troversy, the details of which need not detain us here, involved four
applicants competing for a single VHF license. Each applicant had
varying strengths and weaknesses on each of the agency's criteria. The
FCC award, which went to Biscayne, was justified by a discussion of
each criterion as applied to each applicant, followed by the FCC judg-
ment that on balance the public interest was best served by an award
to Biscayne.30 The Commission did not indicate how its criteria were
to be weighed, if at all, either in general or as applied to the applicants
before it. The court of appeals reversed the award, specifically disagree-
ing with the Commission's failure to characterize the involvement of
one of Biscayne's directors with NBC as a serious conflict of interest.31
On remand the FCC took the conflict of interest as a "demerit"
against Biscayne but nevertheless found that on balance the award
should still go to that applicant.
3 2
I present this sequence because it has interesting implications for
the delivery of extraordinary medical services. The latter is, of course,
essentially a comparative process. On the assumption that there exists
a list of more or less agreed-upon criteria for selection, how is the process
the inequity by minimizing his inputs into the situation, in effect saying "I really don't
work that hard." The individual could also distort the other's inputs such that it appears
that the other deserves more.
There would seem to be yet another manner in which inequity could be reduced.
One manner of reducing cognitive dissonance is for the recipient of the discrepant com-
munication to devalue the communicator-to decide, in effect, that the communicator
does not know what he is talking about. In a similar sense, if the felt inequity has
occurred because of a decision, the person who felt the inequity might reduce it by
taking action against the decision maker. This action could take many different forms,
but one that might occur is that the recipient could disregard the decision. If an in-
dividual devalues a communicator, it is so that he has no further need to listen to him.
He can disregard the communicator. In inequity, disregarding the decision could mean
taking action to change the decision since the individual has no reason to abide by it.
The discussion of Adams's formulations is derived from two articles. Adams, In-
equity in Social Exchange in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (L.
Berkowitz ed. 1965); Adams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. OF ABNORMAL
& Soc. PsYC. 422 (1963).
28. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
29. WHDH, 22 F.C.C. 767 (1957).
30. 11 Radio Reg. 1113 (1956).
31. Sunbeam Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir., 1957).
32. 22 F.C.C. 1464 (1957).
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to operate where an applicant shows stronger than others in some re-
spects but is weaker under other criteria. How is the list to be weighed,
if at all? Is a point system possible? If so, is it wise to base these de-
cisions on what must be to some extent spurious mathematics? How-
ever, in the absence of math the decision involves substantial discretion
even though that discretion may operate within standards and be sur-
rounded (to some extent) by safeguards.
3
Certainly the Biscayne case and the style of legal process used to
decide it raise larger questions of the role of "discretion" in a "legal"
system.34 But in somewhat more narrow terms, it is my view that there
is a real choice between the style of distributive process exemplified
by Biscayne and the style of "free" discretion exemplified by jury dis-
cretion to impose or withhold the death penalty sanction by the Court
in McGautha v. California.35 To some extent the Court's decision in
that case was the result of its view that alternative styles purporting to
control jury discretion did not really do so, and that the formulation
of meaningful standards was practically impossible. The FCC process
may be taken to mean that even where the formulation of relevant
criteria is possible, it still may not be possible to indicate with precision
the basis of a particular decision. But this does not mean that the
criteria are meaningless or without effect: in Hart's terms, there is a
real difference between the game of baseball and a game called "scorer's
discretion."3 6 On the other hand, McGautha may be taken as indicating
that in some circumstances it is best to concede that "guided" discre-
tion is not possible or suggesting that decisions are more law bound than
is probably the case. It is in this area that the examination of "justified
rule departures" constitutes a lasting contribution to jurisprudence. 7
These two process styles are not, however, the only alternatives.
Earlier I raised the question whether there are circumstances when
justice requires that decisions not be based on purposeful criteria. This
question was raised in discussing the "shipwreck" cases, but I raise
it again here because at least the cynical response to the Biscayne
matter would be to suggest that the license be granted by drawing
lots if the reasons for granting it to one rather than another applicant
33. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
34. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120-50 (1961); Dworkin, Judicial
Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963).
35. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
36. H.L.A. HART, supra note 34, at 139.
37. Kadish & Kadish, On Justified Rule Departures by Officials, 59 CALIF. L. Rvv.
905 (1971).
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cannot be clearly and convincingly articulated. While I recognize that
there is something unseemly about granting a television license by
drawing lots among generally qualified applicants,38 and that a flip of
the coin is out of the question as a method of deciding whether or not
a particular offender should receive the death penalty, it does not fol-
low that a process which gives the appearance of rationality should al-
ways be chosen over one which concedes that rational choice among
competing demands is not possible at a given level of information.
It is undoubtedly true, as the brothers Kadish argue,39 that law often
has symbolic offices to fill; but it is also true that law must be fair
as well as seem rational.
As applied to the delivery of extraordinary medical services, the
problem seems to come down to considering the relative significance
of the following observations about different styles of processes: (1)
the FCC style of guided discretion fulfills the symbolic offices of law
as well as providing some constraining influence on decision makers;
(2) guided discretion may generate cynicism and distrust to the ex-
tent that actual outcomes are perceived as not supportable, ultimately,
on policy-based criteria; (3) guided discretion, as well as the style of
"free" discretion exercised by some juries in death penalty cases, leaves
room for the entry of non-legal or even illegal bases for decision which
can be hidden either by the post hoc articulation of legitimate (but
nondispositive) reasons or by a procedural barrier to any enquiry at
all; (4) and leaving the ultimate decision to the vicissitudes of chance
may be merely unseemly, or constitute a serious concession that crit-
ical decisions having the force of law are being made in the absence
of any policy-based criteria which would justify the decision.
The process I will subsequently suggest attempts to make use of
both chance and guided discretion. The specific arguments supporting
38.
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled
discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a
vast program, such as public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to
abuse. For this reason alone due process requires that selection among applicants
be made in accordance with "ascertainable standards," and, in cases where
many candidates are equally qualified under these standards, that further
selections be made in some reasonable manner such as "by lot or on the basis
of the chronological order of application." Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55,
56 (5th Cir. 1964) (on petition for rehearing).
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
39. Kadish & Kadish, supra note 37.
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the proposal will attempt to develop the foregoing thoughts more
fully.
II. HEMODIALYSIS: DELIVERY PROCESS DRAFr
PART I
Stage 1: Who should be included in the Gross Pool?
Stage 2: Who should be selected for inclusion in the Net Pool?
Stage 3: Who should be selected for inclusion in the Sub Pool?
Stage 4: Who should be selected for hemodialysis therapy?
PART II
A. Board of Overseers
B. Review Agency
C. Appeals from Decisions of the Review Agency
PART I
Stage 1: Who should be included in the Gross Pool?
1. Everyone with chronic renal failure should be included in the
Gross Pool unless they have one or more disqualifying medical char-
acteristics.
2. For purposes of inclusion in the Gross Pool the list of dis-
qualifying characteristics should include only those about which there
is no general prognostic dispute.
3. It shall be the duty of all physicians to submit the names of
individuals meeting the above qualifications for inclusion in the Gross
Pool.
4. No individual shall have standing to complain that another
individual was wrongfully included in the Gross Pool.
5. Any individual who has been refused inclusion in the Gross
Pool shall have the right to appeal such refusal to the Review Agency.
6. In the event of such an appeal the Review Agency shall de-
termine: (a) whether there is substantial evidence indicating the
presence of chronic renal failure; (b) whether there is substantial evi-
dence indicating the presence of disqualifying medical characteristics;
and (c) whether the initial process resulting in exclusion of the in-
dividual from the Gross Pool has been fair and free of abuse.
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7. The Review Agency shall indicate whether the criteria ap-
plicable to the question of inclusion in the Gross Pool have been
properly applied to the particular individual, and/or whether there
is a need for a general adjustment of the governing criteria.
8. The Review Agency shall have the power to order the inclusion
of any particular individual on the basis of a finding that the indi-
vidual qualifies for inclusion in the Gross Pool in accordance with the
criteria set forth above, but shall only recommend general adjustments
in criteria unless in its view such changes are required by applicable
constitutional standards.
Stage 2: Who should be selected for inclusion in the Net Pool?
1. The Net Pool shall be selected on a random basis from the
Gross Pool. The specific size of the Net Pool may be left for subsequent
determination, but where the Gross Pool contains 100 or more indi-
viduals the Net Pool should include at least 25 individuals.
2. Selection of the Net Pool should be by computer or some other
mechanism which assures randomness.
3. Upon selection of the Net Pool all individuals included in the
Gross Pool shall be promptly notified of the results.
4. Any individual not selected for inclusion in the Net Pool
shall have the right of review by the Review Agency.
5. Upon petition by an individual not selected for inclusion in
the Net Pool the Review Agency shall satisfy itself that the Net Pool
selection process operated fairly in all respects.
6. If the Review Agency finds substantial evidence that the se-
lection of the Net Pool was defective, unfair, or contrary to law it shall
order re-selection of the Net Pool. However, if the defect resulted in
unfairness to the claimant only and not to a class of individuals, the
Review Agency shall only order inclusion of the claimant in the Net
Pool.
7. Review of the composition of the Net Pool may not be had on
the grounds that a particular individual or class of individuals was not
included in the Gross Pool.
8. The Review Agency may not order a re-drawing of the Net
Pool on the ground that the process as it actually operated in the par-
ticular instance does not sufficiently assure random selection.
9. The Review Agency shall indicate the extent to which it has
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doubts that selection of the Net Pool is properly random and shall make
any recommendations for change it feels necessary.
Stage 3: Who should be selected for inclusion in the Sub Pool?
1. The selection of the Sub Pool shall be made by a panel of
medical personnel with experience or expertise in the delivery of
hemodialysis therapy on the basis of the records of those individuals
selected for inclusion in the Net Pool, which records shall have been
cleansed of all information bearing upon factors which are hereinafter
specifically excluded from consideration.
2. The Sub Pool shall consist of approximately ten persons se-
lected from the Net Pool.
3. The selection of the Sub Pool shall be on the basis of medical
criteria more refined than those applicable to the inclusion of indi-
viduals in the Gross Pool.
4. The applicable medical criteria MAY NOT include the fol-
lowing: (a) race; (b) sex; (c) social or economic status; (d) number
of dependents; (e) occupation or other employment information; (f)
intelligence; provided, that the individual must meet the minimum
level of intelligence necessary for the operation of the therapeutic
regime; (g) psychological data; provided, that the individual is free
of psychosis, severe neurosis or other gross mental disturbance which
would make adequate operation of the therapeutic regime unlikely be-
yond a fair doubt; (h) geographic location of the individual in rela-
tion to the therapeutic center; and (i) age; provided that the indi-
vidual is under sixty years of age.
5. A medical prognosis that in a particular case hemodialysis ther-
apy is likely to bring on complications that will diminish the quality
of the life of the individual shall not, in itself, preclude inclusion in
the Sub Pool. An example of such a nondisqualifying prognosis is
physiological impotence, hormone imbalance or hormone deficiency.
However, this section is not to be understood to prevent exclusion of
an individual from the Sub Pool on the basis of a judgment that hemo-
dialysis therapy is itself very likely to create or aggravate a serious or
chronic physiological condition. An example of such a potentially dis-
qualifying prognosis is renal osteodystrophy.
6. All individuals in the Net Pool shall be notified as soon as
possible as to whether or not they have been selected for inclusion
in the Sub Pool.
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7' Any individual not selected for inclusion in the- Sub Pool shall
have the right of review by the Review Agency.
8. Upon petition by an individual not selected for inclusion in
the Sub Pool, the Review Agency shall satisfy itself that the Sub Pool
selection "process operated fairly in all respects.
9. If the Review Agency finds substantial evidence that the se-
lection of the Sub Pool was defective, unfair, or contrary to lkw it
shall order re-selection of the Sub Pool. However, if the defect resulted
in unfairness to the claimant only and not to a class of individuals,
the Review Agency shall only order inclusion of the claimant in the
Sub Pool.
10. Review of the composition of the Sub Pool may not be had
on the ground that a particular individual or class of individuals
was not included in the Gross or Net Pools.
11. It shall be the obligation of the Sub Pool selection panel and
the Review Agency to be apprised of the actual operation of thera-
peutic delivery and receive all reports and other information necessary
for this purpose.
12. The Sub Pool selection panel shall inform the Review Agency
of any changes in criteria which result from information derived from
therapeutic experience.
Stage 4: Who should be selected for hemodialysis delivery?
1. Individuals to receive hemodialysis shall be selected from 'the
Sub Pool on a random basis.
2. If the individual is no longer available for hemodialysis therapy
in the sense that he would no longer qualify for inclusion in the Gross
Pool, the individual and the Review Agency shall be so informed, and
another individual shall be randomly selected from the Sub Pool.
3. If there is medical opinion that an individual selected from the
Sub Pool for treatment is not suited for hemodialysis for reasons other
than that he would no longer qualify for inclusion in the Gross Pool,
a petition shall be addressed to the Review Agency for permission to
select another individual from the Sub Pool. The individual originally
selected shall be notified of the petition and have the opportunity to
contest it.
4. When the Review Agency receives a petition for permission
to select another individual on the ground that the individual previ-
ously selected is not suited for hemodialysis, the Review Agency-shall
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grant such permission if: (a) the individual previously selected from
the Sub Pool no longer meets the criteria for inclusion in the Gross
Pool; and (b) the Review Agency is satisfied that the petition to by-
pass the previously selected individual is not based on any of the pro-
hibited criteria set forth above with regard to the selection of the Sub
Pool from the Net Pool.
5. No one shall have standing to object to the order of selection
of individuals for hemodialysis therapy from the Sub Pool except a
member of the Sub Pool on the ground that the process of selection
is not truly random, is unfair or otherwise contrary to law.
6. Review of individual selection from the Sub Pool may not be
had on the ground that a particular individual or class of individuals
was not included in the Gross, Net or Sub Pools.
PART II
A. Board of Overseers
1. The relevant organizational unit (state, regional, federal) shall
create and establish a Board of Overseers.
2. The Board of Overseers shall establish the criteria applicable
to individuals seeking inclusion in the Gross Pool of those awaiting
hemodialysis. Such criteria shall be in accordance with the standards
set forth in Stage 1 of the Delivery Process Draft.
3. The Board of Overseers shall appoint the panel of medical per-
sonnel charged with the task of selecting individuals for inclusion in
the Sub Pool in accordance with the standards and procedures estab-
lished by Stage 3 of the Delivery Process Draft. The Board of Overseers
shall also devise an appropriate mechanism for cleansing the records
of those individuals selected for inclusion in the Net Pool as provided
for by Stage 3 of the Delivery Process Draft.
4. The Board of Overseers shall receive and consider all recom-
mendations of the Review Agency, and shall promptly indicate in a
public document whether or not any action has been taken, and state
the reasons for its decision. The actions of the Board of Overseers in
this regard shall not be reviewable save through an appeal to the Re-
view Agency in the manner provided in the Delivery Process Draft,
and to any court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties thereafter.
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5. The Board of Overseers shall monitor the performance of all
extraordinary medical service delivery in order to determine the need
if any, for changes in the criteria for inclusion of individuals in the
Gross Pool or Sub Pool, or whether changes in the composition of the
Medical Panel are necessary.
6. The Board of Overseers shall establiish the specific mechanisms
by which the process of random selection required by Stage 2 and Stage
4 of the Delivery Process Draft is to be effectuated.
7. The Board of Overseers shall establish appropriate mecha-
nisms for informing all individuals included in the Gross Pool of the
procedure applicable in hemodialysis delivery, and of all decisions at
each stage of the proceedings.
B. Review Agency
1. The Review Agency shall consist of one or more individuals
each of whom shall be qualified in law and medicine. For the purpose
of qualifying for such a position the absence of extensive formal
training in either of these fields shall not conclusively disqualify the
applicant, provided, that qualification is otherwise clearly established.
2. Individuals appointed to the Review Agency shall receive the
protections of office accorded judges of United States Courts under
Article III of the United States Constitution.
C. Appeal from Decision of the Review Agency
1. An appeal from any finding or decision of the Review Agency
shall lie in any court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties upon the record made before the Review Agency. Provided,
that no such appeal shall be taken before the Review Agency has had
an opportunity to hear and decide the matter in accordance with the
provisions of the Delivery Process Draft. Failure to exhaust the latter
remedy shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice to reinstitute
appeal proceedings after final judgment by the Review Agency.
2. Decisions of the Review Agency shall be final, for purposes of
review, without regard to the stage of the proceedings at which a deci-
sion by the Review Agency is sought.
3. Any court in which appeal is sought from a decision of the
Review Agency shall consider the appeal in light of the following: (a)
since the delivery of extraordinary medical services is generally a life-
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saving action, appeals shall be treated with the greatest possible dis-
patch; (b) since the delivery of extraordinary medical services is gen-
erally a life saving action, a tribunal to which an appeal is taken shall
satisfy itself that the procedure established for the delivery of extra-
ordinary medical services comports in all respects with due process of
law, and that such procedure was properly applied in the instant case;
and (c) since the delivery of extraordinary medical services is generally
a life saving action, a tribunal to which an appeal is taken shall enter
no order inconsistent with the goals of maximizing therapeutic success
while eliminating violation of the values expressed by constitutional
notions of due process and equal protection.
III. SELECTION PROCESS FOR HEMODIALYSIS THERAPY: COMMENTARY
The actual selection process herein proposed consists of four stages
in an effort to utilize available decision-making techniques where they
seem to work best without being forced to select among those tech-
niques one which must characterize the entire process. Because the
problem of distributing these lifesaving services is in many ways unique,
process styles must be combined in a somewhat unique fashion.
The first stage of the process has the task of collecting all those
individuals who might benefit from hemodialysis. The technique here
is largely self-selection, but only largely so.
The second stage of the process attempts to create a pool of po-
tential recipients from the larger self-selected group for the purpose
of examining their suitability for treatment on a more refined medical
basis. To conduct such an examination without first culling a smaller
group would probably result in the use of various shorthand methods of
disqualification in order to shrink the size of the group, and would not
permit cleansing the records of irrelevant information in order to
prevent the use of improper criteria. For these reasons the process pro-
vides for the creation of a smaller group of potential recipients (the
Net Pool) by a table of random numbers, chance, or some other non-
rational means.
The third stage of the process is certainly the most important from
a medical point of view. It is at this stage that a group of individuals
who are likely to receive dialysis therapy will be selected. The proposed
process says nothing about the criteria which should be used by the
medical panel which selects this group. Instead, it takes the approach
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of eliminating those matters which should play no part in the delivery
of lifesaving medical services.
The fourth stage says, in effect, that the medical panel should not
be asked to be more precise or rational than it can be given the current
state of medical science. Consequently, selection for treatment will
be more or less by lot from the group selected by the Medical Panel
(Sub Pool).
Stage 1: The Gross Pool
An individual will be included in the Gross Pool upon a diagnosis
of chronic renal failure, or imminent chronic renal failure. The deci-
sion to apply for dialysis should be largely that of the individual rather
than his personal physician or the institution which administers the
therapy. It would be most unwise for a physician in a continuing rela-
tionship with a patient to be put in a position where he must decide
whether or not to recommend the patient for dialysis therapy. Further-
more, unless an individual is clearly not suitable for dialysis he should
be given maximum access to this service. A decision to exclude at this
stage would be final in more than one sense of the word. Absent the
clearest reasons for doing so, no one should be excluded if he suffers
from renal failure.
The first stage does, however, provide for excluding some indi-
viduals from the Gross Pool. Just as no one should be excluded who has
any chance of receiving dialysis treatment, an individual who has no
chance of being found suitable for dialysis should not be included. The
reasons here are both practical and humane. Insofar as there must be
selection from the Gross Pool in order to arrive at a manageable num-
ber of applications, including in the Gross Pool those individuals to be
rejected almost automatically at a later stage serves only to swell the
rolls for no purpose. Furthermore, including an individual who suf-
fers, for example, from a serious circulatory disease in addition to
chronic renal failure can only raise his hopes for treatment. Present-
ing such individuals with what must be a false hope for salvation does
not seem to be in the interests of the individual or serve to strengthen
the general perception of process fairness.
There seems to be considerable agreement in the literature that
some physical conditions disqualify the individual for hemodialysis
therapy. I will not attempt to list these here, save to note that serious
circulatory diseases are a prime example of such conditions. The pro-
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posed process requires that the Board of Overseers40 indicate, through
some public document, those physical conditions which, as a matter
of overwhelming medical consensus, render dialysis therapy prog-
nostically impossible. It must be emphasized that the premise of Stage
1 requries that all doubts in this regard be resolved in favor of inclu-
sion in the Gross Pool.
The same premise also requires that no one have standing to com-
plain of wrongful inclusion in the Gross Pool. In effect, this provision
takes the position that initial inclusion is conclusive evidence of doubt,
and that doubt is sufficient to justify continued inclusion in the Gross
Pool. Therefore, the only basis for appeal to the Review Agency at
this stage is noninclusion.
In the hearing of an appeal on this basis the proposal sets forth
the matters into which the Review Agency may enquire. These in-
clude both the particularities of the individual record and the general
operation of the process at this stage. However, the proposal attempts
to balance general medical expertise and the necessity to revise the
outcome of individual cases by distinguishing the powers of the Re-
view Agency. That is, the Review Agency is given the power to order
the inclusion of the petitioning individual in the Gross Pool. (The
draft makes no specific provision for the finality of the Review Agency's
order in this respect because the proposal otherwise provides that no
one shall have standing to complain of wrongful or mistaken inclusion
in the Gross Pool.) However, any views the Review Agency may have
respecting the general list of excluding medical conditions may only
be expressed in recommendations for adjustments unless the Agency be-
lieves such adjustments are required by applicable constitutional
standards. The latter exception is included in the proposal not because
I am aware of the existence of specific constitutional demands, but on
the general principle that a legal process should never deprive its offi-
cers of the power to order that action be taken in compliance with the
Constitution.
Stage 2: The Net Pool
The major goal of this stage of the process is to formalize and
control an operation that would otherwise take place informally, in-
visibly and without controls. Any process that requires the selection
40. See text at 396-97 supra.
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of a smaller number of units from a larger group necessarily proceeds
first by the elimination of relatively clear cases. Elimination is the es-
sential task at this stage of the process. The major issue, however, is
whether this task should be performed according to therapy-relevant
criteria or in some other manner. The proposal suggests using a method
of random selection for the following reasons.
On the assumption that the collection of the Gross Pool operates
properly, it will be true that most, if not all, of the individuals who
would clearly not be candidates for dialysis will have already been
eliminated. The question is whether there exists therapy-relevant
criteria that are more refined than those applied at Stage One, but
more general than those which need to be considered before making a
final decision for therapy.41 In the belief that there does not exist a
set of criteria which could eliminate cases less clear than those
eliminated at the first stage while leaving harder cases for subsequent
examination, the proposal rejects this mode of proceeding.
There is, however, an additional reason for this rejection. At Stage
Three the proposal takes the position that there are types of personal
information that should play no part in the decision to deliver extra-
ordinary medical services. In order to ensure that such information
does not influence the decision makers it is necessary to cleanse indi-
vidual records of irrelevant data. As I will argue in discussing Stage
Three, this is a necessary and not overly burdensome requirement. But
it would certainly be burdensome were it necessary to cleanse the
records of every individual included in the Gross Pool. Hence it is bet-
ter, from a practical point of view, to avoid the need for excising all
the records at this stage. The proposal avoids this need.
There is a point which should be recalled here. By definition every
individual in the Gross Pool suffers from a chronic, critical condition.
Given this, the remainder of the process concerned with delivering a
scarce, lifesaving service cannot be overly concerned with delivering
the service to the "w¢rong" person. In this context, "wrong" can only
mean that the individual actually receiving the service does not have a
high probability of long term survival, or does not in fact benefit sub-
41. I have not been able to discover such a class of criteria in the literature. This
may be due to poor research, or to the fact that most of the controversy respecting
patient selection has focused on the more controversial aspects of existing practice and
experimentation; criteria of "social worth" and psychological factors are prime examples.
See, e.g., Sand, supra note 17; Shatin, Medical Care and the Social Worth of A Man,
36 AM. J. ORTHOPSYcH. 96 (1966).
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stantially from the therapy. But apart from this meaning of "wrong"
any person selected from the Gross Pool is the "right" one.
Having rejected selecting the Net Pool according to therapy-
relevant criteria, the question is whether some form of random
selection is the only alternative. I believe it is, but this is a judgment
which is difficult to justify because it involves testing the limits of
legal imagination. Selecting individuals from the Gross Pool on a
first-come-first-served basis2 would certainly be possible, but no less
arbitrary than a more truly random method of selection.
The design of Stage 1 and Stage 2 makes no provision for classifying
patients according to degree of renal deterioration. Patients with some
types of renal disease may pass through a period of gradual decline
during which time they may receive other types of medical care. Those
who have passed through this period, or who currently suffer from
renal failure for whatever reason, should obviously be given preference
over those who will survive for some period of time without dialysis.
The proposal has not taken account of this because it is not clear how
many individuals fall into one or another of these categories. For exam-
ple, if there is a significant number of people who have an imme-
diate need for dialysis, the Net Pool should be drawn from this group
alone. On the other hand, if there is a relatively small group of
people with an immediate need they should constitute the Net Pool
and no Stage 2 random selection need be made. In other words,
Stage 2 may be revised to provide for selection of the Net Pool
from the Gross Pool on the basis of the immediacy of need for hemo-
dialysis therapy.
Putting aside this possibility, it is my view that a method of ran-
dom selection is the only fair way of selecting the Net Pool. I concede
that decisions made by operation of chance do not exist (legitimately)
anywhere in our legal tradition.43 However, the explanation for this
phenomenon may be instructive. Where it is suggested that random
selection may be the only fair process three circumstances seem to
coexist: (1) the consequence of the decision to be made is literally
critical; (2) there is a real temptation to value one human life more
than another; and (3) there is no morally acceptable basis for making
judgments of relative desert. That these three circumstances rarely
42. Schupak, Sullivan & Lee, Chronic Hemodialysis in "Unselected" Patients, 67
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 708 (1967).
43. But see supra note 38.
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coexist may account for the absence of random decision making. Apart
from war, the imposition of the criminal death penalty, and the "ship-
wreck" cases, 44 our legal process is never involved with decisions having
critical consequences. Furthermore, these three examples are all consis-
tent with the suggested analysis. Conscription for war is not a sentence
of death but increases the probability of being killed. Even though
conscription for war means the imposition of an increased probability
of death, the selection of specific individuals to be killed is more or
less a function of chance. Likewise, the imposition of the criminal
death penalty is a situation in which there does exist a morally ac-
ceptable basis for making judgments of relative desert. Finally, the
"shipwreck" cases themselves either suggest that the sacrifice is inad-
missible under any circumstances, or that if it is ever to be justified the
selection of the victim cannot be made on the basis of an assigned rela-
tive value of human life, nor as a function of moral desert having
nothing to do with the specific situation.
The delivery .of scarce extraordinary medical services is truly
sui generis in this respect, for all three circumstances do indced co-
exist. The consequence of the decision is critical to human life; there
is indeed a real temptation to value one human life more than another
-a temptation not adequately resisted in Seattle and elsewhere. 45
There is no morally acceptable basis for making judgments of rela-
tive desert.40 The latter is, of course, an assertion, but the asserter of
the contrary should properly bear at least the burden of going forward
if not the burden of proof.
Review at this stage of the procedure likewise assumes that errors
of inclusion should not be reviewable while errors of exclusion should
be. The proposal attempts to draw a remedial distinction depending
on whether a finding of error affects only an individual or a class of
44. See notes 18-27 supra and accompanying text.
45. See Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 21, at 377.
46. But see the suggestion in Shatin, supra note 41:
What considerations should enter into the determination of the social value of
a person? I submit the following for review .... (1) the economic productivity
of the person when well;, (2) age and productive years left; (3) marital and
family status and responsibilities; (4) responsibility for the welfare of others;
(5) medical prognosis and outlook for full recovery; (6) children, friends,
social and community relationships; (7) society's need for his services; (8)
considerations based upon potential contributions to society; (9) history of anti-
social behavior; (10) contribution to the cultural stream of humanity in all
the areas of human endeavor: arts, sciences, humanities, economics, governance.
Id. at 99.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
individuals. The reason for this is largely humane. Once the Net
Pool has been drawn and individuals notified of the fact, it seems al-
most cruel subsequently to notify those selected for inclusion in the
Net Pool that due to error in the process the entire draw is to be re-
jected. The trauma of waiting out the process is difficult enough with-
out visiting additional burdens on those fortunate enough to have
been selected once. Consequently, absent error which infects the en-
tire process to the extent that it significantly prejudices the interests of
a class of individuals, the Review Agency is not authorized to order a
redrawing of the Net Pool. Where an individual or a few individuals
have been wrongly excluded from the Net Pool, however, the Review
Agency is given the authority to order their inclusion in the Net
Pool.
Where the Agency has doubts that the manner of selection does
not sufficiently assure randomness, it should so indicate and recom-
mend any changes it deems necessary. The key term is sufficiently, for
the proposal attempts to distinguish a biased selection of the Net Pool
from a selection which is merely faulty. This, again, is an attempt to
balance the demand for the fairest possible selection process against
the cruelty of repeated selections.
Stage 3: The Sub Pool
From a medical point of view Stage 3 may be the most important
part of the process, for this stage provides for maximizing the thera-
peutic utility of a scarce medical resource. The proposal takes the
position that there is value in providing medical personnel with an op-
portunity to look carefully at the medical records of potential recipients
and make selection decisions on the basis of those records even though
it may not be possible to articulate in law the precise bases upon which
such decisions are to be made. The proposal takes the simpler course
of articulating the factors which are to be irrelevant to the decision-
making process.
The task of the Medical Panel is to select a group of recipients
all of whom have a good therapeutic prognosis. The proposal suggests
that the group be composed of about ten individuals, but this number
is arbitrary and not essential to the scheme. What is essential is that
the Panel select a group rather than a single individual. This serves
.a number of purposes. It eliminates the necessity of making very
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difficult, perhaps impossible, distinctions between individual cases. Fur-
ther, it serves to distance somewhat the impact of responsibility on the
members of the Panel.47 Finally, it facilitates administration in that
47. Before an individual can take action against a decision maker, he must first
be able to attribute responsibility for the decision. In Heider's formulation of the
attribution of responsibility, three factors are involved: ability, intent and foreseeability.
F. HEmWER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958). Before an individual
can attribute responsibility for an outcome, be it harmful or beneficial, he must be able
to attribute ability to the actor. If the actor did not have the ability to cause the out-
come, there is no way in which he can be responsible for it. In the instance of delivery
of dialysis machines, it is obvious that the actor (doctor, agency, random number table)
has the ability to effect the outcome.
If the person decides that the actor had the ability to cause the outcome, he can
go on to assess foreseeabiity and intent. Foreseeability deals with whether or not the
actor could (or did) foresee the consequences of his action. The more he is seen to
have foreseen the consequences of the act, the more responsibility is attributed to him.
Whether or not the consequences of an act are perceived as foreseen will, in large
measure, be determined by cultural norms. There is general agreement that an in-
dividual should foresee the consequences of firing a loaded revolver at another in-
dividual. In those cases where generally understood norms or rules cannot be brought to
bear, in those cases where the degree of foresight is ambiguous, responsibility can be
less readily attributed.
The final criteria for attribution of responsibility is whether or not the individual
intended the consequences. Intent is generally based on the degree to which the actor
desired the consequences. The attribution of intent, or its absence, depends on the
ambiguity of the situation. If an individual harms another, intention will be inferred
if there exists no compelling environmental forces that could have forced the act. To
the degree that environmental forces are apparent, intent will not be inferred. Also, the
less socially desirable the outcome of the act, the more likely is intent to be inferred.
This is based on the assumption that an individual in the absence of environmental
forces, would not perform an act of low social desirability if he did not intend it.
A final factor in the attribution of responsibility is whether the actor produced an
outcome for which he foresaw the consequences and which he intended, but under
circumstances which justified his actions. In this situation, the perceiver will attribute
less responsibility. A situation that could fit this condition would be one in which a
man kills in self-defense. He probably foresaw the consequences of his actions (shooting
at someone who shot at him) and he may have intended the outcome, but less re-
sponsibility will be attributable because the circumstances justified his actions.
As was noted earlier (see note 27 supra), the implication of attributing responsibility
to an individual is that the attributor may take action of some sort. If the actor has
harmed the attributor, the attributor may undertake some kind of revenge or retribution. If
the actor has benefited the attributor, he will probably attempt to reciprocate the benefit.
In the delivery of dialysis, it is this element of action that is important, and it is the
element of action that makes meaningful the link between the attribution of responsi-
bility and inequity.
Within the context of this problem, the possible attributes that might be perceived
as inputs are numerous and the possible outcomes are dichotomous. The outcomes are
either life or death. In this situation, there are two possible cases of inequity: (1) an
individual who receives dialysis feels inequity; and (2) an individual who does not
receive dialysis feels inequity. The first case is of least importance for three reasons.
First, in relation to the total pool of patients the number receiving machines will be
small. Secondly, there is research indicating that when an inequitable exchange results
in benefits for the party, there is a higher tolerance for the inequity and hence, the
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
there need not be a selection meeting each time a dialysis machine
becomes available. In combination with Stage 4, Stage 3 provides for
the selection of a group all the members of which will receive dialysis,
providing there are no relevant changes in condition between the time
of selection and the time of delivery.
individual will be less apt to attempt to reduce it. See E. JAQuEs, EQUITABLIn PAYAIENT
(1961). Thirdly, if he does attempt to reduce the inequity he is likely to distort his
inputs such that they appear greater than they are.
The individual in the second case is more of a problem, since his inequity will
probably be more intense. A decision has been made that may cost him his life. In this
situation, the expedients of distorting inputs until inequity is reduced, or of leaving
the field, both leave the person without dialysis and without much hope of survival.
Inequity may be reduced by a change of comparison figure if the individual can be
made to compare himself with those who did not receive dialysis and not with those
who did. One manner of increasing the probability of this occurring is emphasizing,
when the individual enters the pool, the large number of people in the pool and the
small number of dialysis machines. This will not only lower his expectations for receiving
dialysis, but it may also lead him to view the larger group as the one with which he
should compare himself. If the individual does not reduce inequity in this manner, he
is left with fixing blame for his position. In fixing blame, or responsibility, he can devalue
the decision and take action to change it.
If the individual attempts to ffi responsibility, he will have to find someone who
fits the criteria of ability, foresight, and intention. The first two criteria present no
problem, since the group making the decision has the ability to do so, and since the
consequences of the decision are well known to all participating in the process. The
one variable in the situation becomes intent. As was noted earlier, intention will be
attributed only if the individual performing the act appears to do it with no constraints
from the environment. If the decision appears to be freely made, intention will be
attributed. If, however, the environment imposes constraints on the decision maker,
the attributor cannot attribute any disposition to the decision maker since his information
is ambiguous. In this situation, the attributor cannot attribute responsibility to anything
against which he can take action, and he cannot take action.
If the individual cannot attribute responsibility to the decision maker, he may
attribute responsibility to the environment that has constrained the decision maker. This
could mean that the individual decides that fate had dealt him a sad blow or that it
was an act of God or a similar type of belief. He could also attribute responsibility to
the process within which the decision maker had to operate. This could be a problem
in the delivery of dialysis if the individual attempts to act against the process. This
could be avoided, however, if the individual is allowed to choose if he will enter the
process. By allowing choice, two things are accomplished. First, the individual will have
to attribute responsibility to himself, since he will fill all three of the conditions for
the attribution of responsibility. Secondly, by having the individual choose, with full
knowledge of the implications of his choice, he has made a public commitment to the
process and he cannot attack the process without repudiating this commitment. This
will be difficult for the individual, since repudiation of the process will reflect not on
the process but on the judgment of the individual. Such a repudiation must also decrease
the individual's self-esteem since he will be saying that he made the mistake in the
first place, and people will usually act to protect their self-esteem, even if it means the
use of distortion.
There are two variables that can mediate the attribution of responsibility: in-
volvement and severity of outcome. A study by Lowe and Goldstein varied the degree
of involvement of the subjects by having some be role players and the others be involved.
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The proposal's list of excluded factors may be the most contro-
versial section of this article. The literature is replete with instances
in which almost all of these factors have been used as selection cri-
teria either for experimental purposes, as a matter of institutional
policy, or as a matter of semi-conscious bias.
4
The factor of race may be the only factor excluded by the proposal
which clearly may not be considered as a matter of law. The proposal
excludes it for this reason, and to underscore the care which must be
taken to avoid applying other criteria which have the effect of dis-
advantaging a particular race or other ethnic group.
49
Sexually biased selection is probably unconstitutional, but the
matter is not perfectly clear.50
The realistic problem here is not necessarily overt sex discrimina-
tion, but the covert intrusion of sexual bias. Indeed, the way in which
such bias appears in the literature tends to indicate the extent to
which professional personnel are not even aware of it. The report of
one study group indicates that it has been informed that women will
also be potential recipients of hemodialysis therapy. Institutions which
define rehabilitation as being a full return to productive social life
often do not consider occupational rehabilitation relevant in the case
The more involved subjects were found to distort intention more than the role players
who, presumably, were not as involved. Lowe & Goldstein, Reciprocal Liking and
Attributions of Ability: Mediating Effects of Perceived Intent and Personal Involvement,
16 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYcn. 291, 291-92 (1970). What this suggests is that clients
in the delivery process may, if they do not receive dialysis, distort the perceived inten-
tions of the decision maker. To prevent this, the constraints acting on the decision
maker should be very evident. One favorable implication of this is that the public, which
will have a fairly low involvement, is not apt to distort the intentions of the decision
maker. Thus from at least one approach, there is not likely to be much of a problem.
Several studies have been done dealing with the intensity of the consequences. See,
e.g., Shaw & Sulzer, An Empirical Test of Heider's Levels in Attribution of Responsi-
bility, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PsYCr. 39 (1964); Walster, The Assignment of. Re-
sponsibility for an Accident, 5 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 508-16 (1966). The
basic finding is that there is a greater tendency to attribute responsibility to an actor
when the consequences of his actions have had severe negative results. It appears that
the perceiver has a greater need to attribute responsibility to someone as the outcomes
increase. See A. HASTORF, D. SCHNEDER & J. POLEFKA, PERSON PERCEPTION (1970).
Since the consequences of not receiving dialysis axe most severe, this tendency should
be very strong. Again, this means that the forces acting on the decision maker must be
very clear, and that they should leave little chance to perceive freedom of decision. The
greater the perceived freedom of decision, the more likely that responsibility will be
attributed.
48. See, e.g., Sand, supra note 17; Shatin, supra note 41.
49. I will return to this in discussing certain of the other excluded criteria. See
notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
50. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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of female recipients.51 Again, what is most disturbing in these reports
is the total lack of sensitivity to the meaning of these decisions.
Sex distinction raises a problem beyond its own terms: the con-
cern with "full" rehabilitation. Defining rehabilitation to include
matters well beyond those of specific medical concern tends to make
matters such as sex colorably relevant. While the case for the relevance
of sex even under such a definition of rehabilitation is weak, a num-
ber of other factors specifically excluded by the proposal achieve their
prominence as a direct result of a broad definition of rehabilitation.
The proposal takes the position that rehabilitation means medical re-
habilitation, not social rehabilitation. The proposal takes this position
in principle, and because a social definition of rehabilitation necessarily
involves considering factors which require judgments about the rela-
tive value of life styles. Such judgments may never be admissible in
public processes and they are certainly not admissible when the issue
is the delivery of life saving medical services. 52
The proposal takes the position that all those factors which have
been treated as relevant through a broad definition of rehabilitation
must be excluded from consideration. 53 This includes social or eco-
nomic status, number of dependents and occupation or other employ-
ment information. The only one of these that is even arguably rele-
vant to medical rehabilitation is the number of dependents an indi-
vidual may have insofar as it can be argued that successful dialysis
51. See Sand, supra note 17, at 607. In an instance involving a male patient,
occupational rehabilitation was also given a narrow interpretation:
This patient has indeed been a compliant, satisfactory patient. He takes good
care of himself and shows very little emotional discomfort. However, he has
never been rehabilitated occupationally. Since obtaining full disability status
for the Social Security Administration, he takes care of household duties and
his children while his wife works full-time.
Id.
52. The Seattle Artificial Kidney Center is important in that such process problems
were not recognized. See Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 21. The neutrality with
which the Seattle process has been dealt with in the literature indicates the depths of
academic cynicism: everything that is deserves rational consideration even if it is an
outrage on its face.
53. But cf. Meldrum, supra note 14 at 37:
As the principle criterion for selection of patients for chronic hemodialysis
should be a potential of complete rehabilitation and full-time gainful occupa-
tions ... sociologic as well as medical data are necessary in retrospective analysis
of the results of such therapy.
Id.
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therapy requires strong motivation by the patient and substantial so-
cial support to avoid serious depression.5 4 But such observations or
arguments are totally without substance. Has an elderly person ever
been refused hip surgery (no pun intended) because he or she was with-
out substantial social support which would make physical rehabilitation
more likely? In these circumstances every effort is made to find support
services to substitute for those the individual cannot provide for him-
self. Can there be any justification for denying extraordinary, lifesav-
ing medical services to an individual because the support services re-
quired are too expensive?
The literature indicates that level of intelligence has been used
as a selection criterion. No systematic analysis is made of the medical
need for this information. All that is offered is the observation that
the dialysis program requires careful attention to a set of instructions
for keeping the shunt clean and dietary control. Where the dialysis is
performed in an institution, as it always will be for a person of low
intelligence since such people rarely have the capital necessary to
purchase their own dialysis machine, supervision of therapy is pro-
vided by the staff. If certain details of the therapy are beyond the
comprehension of the patient additional supervision may be required.
Thus, to exclude a person because of low intelligence really means
leaving that person to die because providing additional supervision
is burdensome in some relevant way.
Nevertheless, the proposal recognizes that a certain minimum level
of intelligence may be required for the therapy to work at all. This
minimum level is not defined, but it is intended that the term neces-
sary be taken literally. This means that dialysis for a mongolian
idiot who is being cared for by his parents or parent surrogate presents
a close case.
The literature indicates substantial interest in the question of
the use and predictive capacity of psychological data. This data is gen-
erated, for the most part, by administering tests like the MMPI or TAT,
and by an interview with psychiatric personnel. A prediction is then
made whether the individual will do well or poorly on dialysis therapy.
The data may indicate certain themes in the individual personality
which make it more or less likely that certain syndromes will appear
54. See Johnson, Wagoner, Hunt, Mueller & Hallenbeck, Long-Term Intermittent
Hemodialysis for Chronic Renal Failure, 41 MAYo CLiN. PRoc. 73 (1966).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in the course of therapy; severe depression, extreme dependency and
irritability are common examples.55
The case for using this information seems to be as follows. In-
dividuals with certain personality characteristics which indicate a high
probability of depression, for example, are poor survival risks in that
they may develop what I would call the "Dylan Thomas Syndrome":
embarking on suicidal food binges. To the extent these people
are poor survival risks resources that could have saved a life
are wasted. In addition, individuals who become "troublemakers"
during therapy place a severe strain on the staff, and may have a bad
effect, direct as well as indirect, on other dialysis patients. Further-
more, individuals who become extremely dependent have a demoraliz-
ing effect on others--particularly members of their family-which ef-
fect may outlive either the patient or his need for dialysis. Finally,
psychological problems increase the cost of service delivery.
-Evaluating the success of psychological predictions means paying
careful attention to the available statistical analyses. This means, in
turn, that if psychological predictions are relevant an individual may be
rejected because he has characteristics which have been shown sta-
tistically to indicate a high probability of poor performance during
the therapeutic regime. In this regard I will borrow a critical norm
from the criminal law process. Henry Hart once observed that no-
where (apart from strict liability offenses) "in the criminal law is
the probable, or even the certain guilt of nine men regarded as suffi-
cient warrant for the conviction of a tenth." 6 Indeed, it is probably
also true that nowhere in the ordinary medical process is the probable
failure of a treatment regime on nine individuals sufficient warrant
for withholding it from a tenth. On what basis can a case be made for
treating dialysis patients differently? One possibility is that dialysis
patients are receiving health-restoring and/or life-saving services, and
their behavior should reflect their gratitude or at least their apprecia-
tion.57 Does the medical staff realize that they are saying the unapprecia-
55. See Simmons & Simmons, Organ-Transplantation: A Societal Problem, 19
SoC. PROB. 36, 44-46 (1971).
56. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEDIP. PROD. 401, 422-23
(1958).
57. Cf. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 31 (1964): "Where awards and
honors are granted we are content with more informal, less scrutinized methods of
decision." See also R. O'NEIL, THn PRicF OF DEPENDENCY 39-57 (1970). In one case
a candidate for dialysis was found, by preselection examination, to be defensive and
resentful with a tendency "to assert his independence to an unrealistic degree." It was
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tive patient should be left to die? Is it conceivable they would-take the
same position if the same patient had emphysema? There seems to be
something in the perceptual organization of staff personnel that -leads
them to regard dialysis as a peculiar sort of medical service, and this
perception leads them to feel that patients with behavior difficulties are
intolerable in this context where they would be tolerable in another.
Apart from the general issue of whether an individual can ever
be refused therapy for statistical reasons, the specific reliability of the
predictions need to be assessed. In brief, the literature indicates that
there are certain strong correlations, but every such report of which I
am aware contains its own refutation.58 If certain individuals are
felt that he might deny his illness, and that this denial "might include lack of proper
compliance and passivity as a patient." Sand, supra note 17, at 606. This individual
was indeed a difficult patient, and it is reported that the staff "uniformly see him as an
inappropriate kind of person for a chronic dialysis program." Id.
58. The report in Sand, supra note 17, is one of the best of its kind. The summary
of the paper states that "variations that do exist in adjustment can be predicted at statis-
tically significant levels, from pretreatment psychological and psychiatric description of
,the patients." Id. at 609. But a paragraph from the body of the paper has a somewhat
different thrust:
'These [statistical] relationships indicate that patient psychological characteristics
must indeed be a very important factor in adjustment to chronic hemodialysis,
since a brief pretreatment assessment of the patient's characteristics does in
many cases yield reasonably accurate predictions about potential adjustment.
This is even more apparent when one considers factors emerging after pre-
treatment' evaluations-such as chance individual variations in the level and
frequency of medical complications and special efforts the medical staff might
make to improve the adjustment of initially marginal patients-work to reduce
the relationship between pretreatment predictions and judged cooperation and
adjustment. On the other hand, some errors in prediction from psychological
data do occur. For this reason it would seem much wiser to use psychological
data to anticipate patient difficulties and assist in meeting them than for
selection.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Elsewhere the same report indicates that two patients rated
as poor on both adjustment and cooperation dimensions had to be re-rated as adequate.
"In one of these patients the resolution of unique clotting problems seemed associated
with his improved adjustment. Improvement in the second patient appeared to be asso-
ciated with his being followed by a physician who spent much more time talking with
him than had previous doctors." Id. at 605.
Against this it is necessary to consider Abram's survey of the literature on adapta-
tion and psychiatric complications among dialysis patients. The impressionistic reports
are that centers which pre-select for stability and the like show a markedly lower in-
cidence of emotional complications than the centers who receive patients on a first-come-
first-served-basis. Likewise, the rough table Abram constructs shows a similar trend
though with somewhat diminished force due to the small number of patients involved
and the use of uninformative labels like "neuroticddepression" and. "schizophrenic-like
episodes." Abram, The Psychiatrist, the Treatment of Chronic Renal Failure, and the
Prolongation of Life: 1, 124 AmER. J. oF Psycnr. 1351, 1352 (1968).
,Perhaps it is worth mentioning that internal inconsistencies also appear in papers
dealing with selection on other bases. Good results were reported where patients were
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likely to be unreliable patients, the prediction of their unreliability is
just as unreliable. This appears to be true for two major reasons: (1)
the predictions are made before treatment-which means the indi-
vidual being observed is very sick; (2) the prediction may be offset by
a multiplicity of factors intruding during the course of treatment, such
as the infusion of helping and caring personnel as well as improved
medical condition.
One further observation is in order. If psychological criteria are to
be used on the basis of information currently available further informa-
tion will never be available: patients rejected from a dialysis program
tend not to survive-thereby serving as something less than an ideal
control group. It is difficult to tell whether there are any "false posi-
tives" in this group. By rejecting psychological criteria, however, ex-
perience may generate information that will either permit more pre-
cise predictions, or suggest therapeutic efforts to reduce the incidence
of emotional disturbance among this patient population.
While the proposal rejects psychological criteria in general, it
permits rejection upon a finding of psychosis, severe neurosis or other
gross mental disturbance which would make adequate operation
unlikely beyond a fair doubt.
It is clear that the location of the dialysis recipient in relation to
the dialysis center can present a serious economic problem. This can
arise because of the cost of travel to and from the center; the cost of re-
locating in order to be near the center; the indirect economic conse-
quences of family relocation. This problem can be partially solved
by rational districting of dialysis delivery centers, but there will still
be cases involving unusual cost due to the distance between the serv-
ice delivery center and the patient.
The proposal takes the position that location of potential recipi-
ents should play no part in the allocation of the medical service. There
are two primary reasons for taking this position. First, the process pro-
posed generally takes no account of cost or the allocation of the bur-
den of that cost. Second, regardless of the fact that it may be econom-
ically impossible to deliver services to the individuals who are unable
to pay, the recipient so situated should not be excluded from con-
sideration until the last possible moment. There are several reasons
selected for their better potential for vocational rehabilitation. This paper states: "It
is noteworthy that several selectees exceeded staff expectations for social and vocational
rehabilitation when their medical conditions were improved and stabilized." Meldrum,
supra note 14, at 49 (emphasis added).
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for this, one of which is similar to the reason we keep alive as long
as possible individuals who suffer from incurable conditions. These
individuals are kept alive as long as possible because the possibility of
success from an ad hoc treatment regime "working" in a particular case
can never be foreclosed, and because it is always possible that a generic
cure will be discovered. Similarly, the patient who is presently unable
to pay may at any time "find" the money, or it may be forthcoming
from a collateral source. Hence the proposal takes the position that
no cost related factors may be considered until a particular individual
has been selected for treatment and is scheduled to receive it.
There is also a kind of political reason for the position taken by
the proposal. If individuals are to be left to die because they cannot
afford the service, this situation should be made as obvious as possible
and not be hidden from view by the selection process itself. If it is to
be the case that of the individuals whom the Medical Panel indicates
are equally in need of treatment only the well-off will receive it, this
fact should be made totally explicit and not hidden in the delibera-
tions of the Medical Panel.
The medical literature is virtually unanimous on the question of
age. Since Scribner published his list of selection criteria in 196359
almost every report indicates that only individuals past puberty but
under 40 or 45 years of age are considered suitable candidates for hemo-
dialysis.60 The proposal takes the position that age is not to be consid-
ered provided that the individual is under 60 years of age.
I am less than clear on the reasons behind the existing practice
regarding the upper age limit. Of course, older people are more likely
to suffer from complicating conditions at the time they apply for dial-
ysis, but the existence of such conditions would disqualify them regard-
less of age. Older people are also more likely to develop serious com-
plicating conditions after they begin dialysis, but this is also true with
any medical or surgical regime. On the basis of a rather small sample
(16 patients 39 years old or under, 8 patients 40 years old or over),
Meldrum reports that the "response" of older patients "was limited"
while the younger patients "were above average in all categories of
rehabilitation."' l Because I dealt with the matter of statistical exclu-
59. B. SCRIBNER, PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER TRE TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS wITH CHRONIC KIDNEY DISEASE WITH UREMIA (1963).
60. See, e.g., Abram, supra note 58.
61. Meldrum, supra note 14, at 49.
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sion at some length earlier,62 I will only note here that an important
reason for excluding older people from the treatment program seems
to be that they have a poorer track record than younger people-a
finding which probably did not astonish medical science. But I have
found nothing in the literature suggesting a medical basis for with-
holding dialysis from this group which would not also apply to more
ordinary treatments. In the absence of a medical basis one is left to
conclude that the reason for withholding dialysis from the older group
is that (1) it is a waste of resources if these patients do not "do well"
on dialysis; (2) older patients need more medical services because of
their greater tendency to develop complications, hence they are more
expensive to treat. I believe these reasons have been adequately re-
futed in earlier sections of this commentary.
The proposal sets an upper age limit of 60 years, but even this is
probably not necessary given the high probability of complicating con-
ditions apparent at the time of application for dialysis. In any event,
the proposal merely states that age is not irrelevant if the individual is
over 60 years; it does not automatically exclude a person over that age. 3
The problem with very young people is quite different. The cur-
rent general practice is to exclude children because dialysis tends to
prevent puberty, and because children present serious behavior prob-
lems in terms of their ability to follow the stringent requirements of
the program and the emotional demands they often place upon the
family and medical personnel. The proposal rejects any minimum age
requirement on the ground that the above stated reasons are beyond
the ken of medical judgment.
In the section immediately following that dealing with age, the
proposal takes the position that prognoses which indicate the proba-
bility of medical complications which will diminish the quality of
life may not work to exclude a particular individual. In my view, the
hormone problem falls within this provision. It may well be that an
individual who does not pass through puberty has a shorter life ex-
pectancy, but that is also true for large numbers of brain damaged
children who are kept alive, often at public expense, and who will be
62. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
63. In the list of patients involved in the selection process at the University of
Virginia Renal Unit (1966), in only one of the 23 cases was the reason for rejection
stated to be age alone-the individual was 68. In all other cases involving older people
the reason given was medical, generally the presence of other serious conditions. In one
case the reason given was age-the patient was 52-plus "disinterest." See Abram, supra
note 58 at 1353.
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totally non-productive. But apart from decreasing life expectancy,
all that can be said about the non-pubescent individual is that the
quality of his life will be curtailed thereby. It may be that the child or
his parents would choose death as a preferred alternative, raising seri-
ous legal problems to the extent that the parents make the choice. But
in any case it is not a choice either the Medical Panel or the public at
large has the right to make, particularly if the latter continues to pro-
hibit the abortion of a seriously deformed fetus.
It is possible that an unstated reason for withholding dialysis from
the prepubescent is that if dialysis is otherwise successful these indi-
viduals should be able to lead lives sufficiently normal to enable them
to be seen in public. Their failure to develop sexually may be quite
apparent, and it is possible that we would prefer not to see this.64
The behavioral problems involved in dialysis therapy for young
people are serious; one cannot read reports of these experiences with-
out sadness and compassion.65 Nevertheless, this is but another instance
in which additional support services are crucial. No one seems willing to
face up to the fact that the current exclusion reflects the following un-
articulated policy statement: "It is better for these children to die than
be a burden on their family and available medical services, particu-
larly when they may die even if an extraordinary effort is made on their
behalf." If this is to be the policy it should be stated openly and not
hidden in the deliberations of the Medical Panel.
As stated earlier, the proposal takes the position that complicat-
ing conditions which may diminish the quality of life should not be con-
sidered by the selection process. This cannot be a medical choice any
more than it would be a medical choice to allow a patient to die of
gangrene poisoning rather than amputate a limb because the surgery
would diminish the quality of the patient's life.
Stage 4: Delivery of the Service
The proposal is for random selection of individuals from the Sub
Pool. The earlier discussion of the appropriateness of a random process
applies equally to this stage and will not be repeated. Likewise, re-
maining provisions of Stage 4 raise no special problems which require
additional discussion.
64. See D. DAUBE, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL ADVANCE, 1970 LIONEL COHEN
LECTURE, HEBREW UNIVERSITY 19-21.
65. See, e.g., Salisbury, Behavioral Responses of a Nine-Year Old Child on Chronic
Dialysis, 7 J. AMER. AcAi. CHmLD PSYCH. 282 (1968).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
IV. THE RELATION BETWEEN HEMODIALYSIS
SELECTION AND THE SELECTION OF
PATIENTS FOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION
Individuals with chronic renal failure may be candidates for both
hemodialysis and kidney transplantation. I suggest that only minor
variations in the basic Delivery Process Draft need be made to account
for this.
The Gross Pool should include all individuals who suffer from
chronic renal failure. Since it appears that those conditions which
would make an individual ineligible for dialysis would also preclude
successful transplantation, no additional excluding conditions need be
applied at this point. Of course, to the extent this is not true additional
criteria may be created and applied-so long as the principle under-
lying the structure of the Gross Pool is respected.
I am advised that at this time it is not possible to identify a
"universal recipient" for the purpose of kidney transplantation. If this
is true, then there appears to be no need to create an entirely separate
pool of individuals for transplant and for dialysis. In addition, there is
no need at this point to force an election between dialysis and trans-
plantation. An individual with renal failure may be a potential re-
cipient of either, and should remain in the process for this purpose.
However, it is necessary to modify the Net Pool (Stage 2) in order
to select individuals to receive transplants. This should be done in
the following manner.
At this date is appears that tissue typing techniques are not suffi-
ciently sophisticated to enable a final matching of organ and recipient.
However, it does appear that existing tissue typing techniques will
enable the selection of a group of better recipients from a larger group
of individuals all of whom suffer from chronic renal failure. There-
fore, the Delivery Process Draft should be modified to provide that the
selection of the Net Pool be made on the basis of tissue typing. This
should yield the best group of recipients from the Gross Pool for a
given organ. (Note that there is no reason to force an election at this
point either. Individuals selected for inclusion in a Net Pool of poten-
tial organ recipients should remain in the Gross Pool for the purpose
of selection for dialysis.)
For the purpose of delivering kidneys for transplantation the re-
mainder of the Delivery Process Draft should be essentially the same.
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Following the selection of the Net Pool in the manner just described,
a smaller group should be selected by a Medical Panel on the basis
of appropriate medical criteria upon examination of all the (appro-
priately cleansed) records. The only major process difference comes at
Stage 4. Since the individuals selected for the Sub Pool are appropriate
only for a particular organ, only one individual can be selected from
this group. Consistent with the principle underlying Stage 4 of the
Delivery Process Draft, this selection should be done on a random
basis. The individuals remaining who have not been selected to re-
ceive this particular organ should go back in the Gross Pool.66
It is only at this stage that it may be possible for an individual to
elect dialysis or transplantation, and this is only possible in the event
he has been selected from the Sub Pool for delivery of an organ and
is also a member of the dialysis Sub Pool waiting his turn for a ma-
chine. Such a fortunate is in the position to make an election; but it
is doubtful whether this would be a frequent occurrence.
It should go without saying that dialysis facilities should not
operate at a capacity which would prohibit the use of machines by in-
dividuals actually awaiting transplantation. Facilities should be set
aside for such purposes and be considered not available for chronic
dialysis.
V. THE DELIVERY OF ORGANS, OTHER THAN
KIDNEYS, FOR TRANSPLANTATION
With the modifications suggested in the foregoing section dealing
with the delivery of kidneys for transplantation, the Delivery Process
Draft may be adopted for the general purpose of selecting patients to
receive transplants of any type. All individuals in need of an organ
should be included in a Gross Pool, provided they are not excludable
by the application of criteria created in accordance with the principle
underlying Stage 1. The Net Pool should be drawn by the applica-
tion of existing tissue typing technology. The Sub Pool should be se-
lected by a Medical Panel with the restrictions set forth in the De-
livery Process Draft fully applicable. Finally, the actual recipient should
66. There is a serious issue whether individuals whose immunological system has
rejected a transplanted organ should receive preference for the receipt of dialysis or a
second attempt at transplantation. I have been unable to deal with this problem in
a satisfactory manner.
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be drawn from the Sub Pool by lot in accordance with the modification
introduced in the foregoing section dealing with kidneys.
It is possible, of course, that modifications of detail may be neces-
sary to meet particular medical problems. However, the purpose of
this discussion is to indicate the way in which the Delivery Process
Draft can be adapted to the demands of a particular medical service.
It is sufficient to recognize that each stage of the Delivery Process Draft
has a basis in principle; so long as the principle is recognized altera-
tions of detail should not render the making of a decision impossible
or unfair.67
67. Three matters came to my attention after the body of this article was set.
1. Relevant to the general issue of cost, at 373-76 supra and passim, effective
July 1, 1973, Medicare coverage is extended to renal dialysis and transplantation. Pub.
L. No. 92-603, § 2991 (Oct. 30, 1972).
2. Relevant to the potential size of the Gross Pool, at 399 supra, see Hallan &
Harris, Estimation of a Potential Hemodialysis Population, 8 MED. CARE J. 209 (1970),
which utilizes the Delphi method to arrive at an estimate of 67-84 cases per million
population.
3. It has been reported that Swedish hospitals are not permitted to withhold
dialysis treatment because of the presence of other diseases in the patient or on the
basis of the patient's age. Alwall, Development of Dialysis Activity in Sweden, Need for
Dialysis, and Planning for the Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN DIALYSIS
AND TREATMENT ASSOCIATON CONGRESS IN LYON (1966), cited in Hallan & Harris,
supra.
